In the 49th lesson, we were discussing as to what ‘Pratyaksha Pramaa’ is. It was then told that the knowledge, which does not come from some other knowledge, is Pratyaksha Pramaa. We were discussing if this definition was appropriate.
There are a few flaws in this definition. The school of thought of those who have proposed this definition maintain that all the knowledge in the world comes from the knowledge possessed by the Almighty. They say so because, if they do not say so, they cannot explain the existence of knowledge in the world. But the problem comes because they are also saying that Pratyaksha Pramaa cannot come from some other knowledge. It means that it cannot come from the Knowledge of the Almighty also. If it is said that it comes from the Almighty, it cannot be called as Pratyaksha Pramaa, because this knowledge has come from some other knowledge. Thus, the definition put forth by the proponents of this school is self-contradictory. Therefore, this definition is not appropriate.

Some scholars belonging to this school of philosophy have tried to make minor modifications to this definition to overcome this flaw. They propose that instead of saying ‘that which does not come from some other knowledge’, it should be defined as "that knowledge, for which another knowledge is not a Karana (instrument) is Pratyaksha Pramaa".

This definition will overcome the flaw that we pointed out above. Generally, direct knowledge comes from the Almighty; but for this direct knowledge to come, the Almighty’s knowledge has not made any effort. Therefore, for Pratyaksha Jnana (direct knowledge), Ishwara’s knowledge is not the cause, but only a Karana (Instrument). Thus, the flaw is overcome.

Though this seems to be acceptable, we will face a new problem elsewhere. The problem with respect to Smriti (remembrance, recollection). Let us see how.
We experienced something. Because of this experience, a particular type of Samskara got imprinted in the mind. This imprint will by lying dormant in some corner of the mind. After some time, in certain circumstances this Samskara will pop up and the person will remember the past situation. If one asks "what is the Karana (instrument) for this Smriti (recollection)?" we will have to say that the Samskara is the Karana. We cannot say that it is the past experience. Experience is knowledge. It causes Samskara to be imprinted in the mind. There its role ended. After this stage, what works in different stages is the Samskara only. This is not of the nature of knowledge. Therefore, for the Smriti Jnana (knowledge arising out of recollection), some other knowledge is not the Karana (instrument). Therefore, according to the new definition, Smriti Jnana will become Pratyaksha Pramaa. This is contrary to our mundane experience. Therefore, even this definition is not appropriate. (Smriti is just remembering some past experience; it is not a new knowledge).

A question arises here.

Objection: You are suggesting that Samskara is responsible for Smriti Jnana (knowledge arising out of recollection). It need not be projected in that way. It can be proposed that, both Samskara and Smriti came come form experience. Samskara is a byproduct of the main transaction, while experience is the main product. Thus, the instrument responsible for bringing about Smriti is the initial experience only. Therefore, it means that Smriti is something that comes from some other knowledge. Therefore, it cannot be Pratyaksha Pramaa. Therefore, there is no flaw in our definition.

Reply: If you say so, you will face another problem. John is missing since his childhood. When he is found after a long time, say 30 years, the person who recognizes him, says ‘Hey! This is John!’ Such an act of recognizing is called ‘Pratyabhijnaa’. Everyone will accept that this is Pratyaksha Jnana (direct knowledge). Which is the Karana (instrument) for this Pratyabhijnaa (recognition)? Is it not the knowledge coming from recollection (that this is John)? But you are saying that Smriti Jnana (knowledge arising out of recollection) is Pratyaksha Jnana. This became responsible for Pratyabhijnaa (recognizing). Therefore, Pratyabhijnaa (recognizing) cannot be Pratyaksha Jnana (direct knowledge). This contradicts your philosophy, and it contradicts common experience. Whichever way you see it, your definition is not appropriate.

Thus, even the third definition of Pratyaksha Pramaa is also not appropriate. Therefore, Vedantists have proposed a definition in accordance with the Vedas.
Chaitanya itself is Pratyaksha Pramaa

This is a flawless definition of Pratyaksha Pramaa. According to Vedanta, terms like Chaitanya, Jnana, Brahma etc., mean the same. Pramaa is a special knowledge (that is, it is a type of knowledge). Pratyaksha Pramaa is a special Pramaa among different Pramaas (that is, it is a type of Pramaa). Therefore, it is only appropriate that it is Chaitanya itself. Therefore they have defined it as above. Also, it has been mentioned in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad "yat saakshaat aparokshaat brahma". It means, that which is directly perceptible is Brahma.

But, there arises a question here. It has been said that Pratyaksha Pramaa is Chaitanya. For such a Chaitanya (Pratyaksha Pramaa), the instruments are eye etc.. But Chaitanya is Anaadi (without a beginning). Eye is Saadi (with a beginning). How can something that has a beginning be a testimony for something that is without a beginning? This is the question.

This question came because it was said that Chaitanya itself is Pratyaksha Pramaa. Because Chaitanya is Anaadi (without a beginning), it has no birth. Therefore, it does not need Karanas (that is, it does not have a cause behind it). But you are saying that eye is a Pratyaksha Pramaana for it. That means, eye is the Kaarana (cause) for Chaitanya. Kaarana (cause) means Kaaraka (refer to the description of Kaaraka). If it is a Kaaraka, this eye should bring about some modification in Chaitanya. But modification is impossible in Chaitanya. When it is impossible, why should we accept that eye is the cause for Chaitanya?

Let us see.

(to be continued)