It was said that Chaitanya itself is Pratyaksha Pramaa. Chaitanya is Anaadi (without a beginning). It has no birth. It has nothing to do with the Karanas. But you are saying that senses like eyes etc., are the Karanas for Pratyaksha Pramaa. Karana is a type of cause. Kaarana (cause) is in a way, Karaka (refer to the definition of Karaka in previous lessons). That which brings about some change is Karaka. How can any change occur in Chaitanya, which is Anaadi? If it does not occur, why should one say that eye is a Karana for that? – Our discussion had stopped at this juncture.
Reply: Indeed, Chaitanya is Anaadi (without a beginning). But we must understand how this Chaitanya which is Anaadi as well as Sarva Vyapi (all pervasive) will be revealed. When there is Spandana (vibration) in the Antahkarana, the Chaitanya manifests as a form, a taste, a sound, a smell or a touch. The vibration that takes place in the Antahkarana is called as Antahkarana Vritti. How does Antahkarana Vritti occur? When situations occur (such as the senses coming in contact with their objects), Antahkarana Vritti is born. In other words, Antahkarana Vritti is born due to situations such as sense-object contact. Thus, we will recognize Chaitanya only after there is sense-object contact, and subsequent occurrence of a Vritti in the Antahkarana. It is only then that the Chaitanya reveals. Thus, there is a beginning to the Chaitanya that is specific to Antahkarana Vritti. Although it can be said that Chaitanya is without a beginning, it must be conceded that this specific Chaitanya – the one that reveals on account of Antahkarana Vritti, has a beginning.
Such Antahkarana Vritti will be associated with knowledge. Therefore, this Antahkarana Vritti is also called as Jnana (Knowledge). It is a somewhat loose statement. It is generally assumed that when a Jnana type of Vritti arises, people say that Jnana itself arose. Prakaashaatma Yateendra, in His treatise, has said, "People loosely refer to Antahkarana Vritti as Jnana".

As far as the Shuddha Chaitanya is concerned, it is true that the senses (eye etc.,) are not Karanas. We do not dispute it either because, as Chaitanya is self-luminous, and it does not depend on a Karana. But the Chaitanya specific to a Vritti is not self-luminous. Its luminosity depends on the Vritti. The Vrittis in turn are dependent on the Indriyas (senses). Therefore, there is nothing objectionable in the Indriyas functioning as Karanas for such Vrittis.

Objection: If it is so, the answer that you just now gave may give rise to a new question. It is because you said ‘Chaitanya itself is Pratyaksha Pramaa’ that all these questions came up. If it had been said as "Antahkarana Vritti itself is Pramaa", then these objections would not have come up at all. After all, even you have more or less agreed that in a loose way even Antahkarana Vritti is Jnana. Such a Vritti arises by itself from the senses (eyes etc). Therefore, it would have been better if you had said that senses like eyes etc., serve as Karanas for the ‘Gouna’ type of Chaitanya. It would have been so easy. Instead of giving such easy definitions, you are unnecessarily complicating the issue by giving new definitions.

Reply: It is not so. To call Vritti as Chaitanya (Jnana) is only a loose definition and is insignificant in its application. It is not a solid and essential definition. Even the Shrutis (the Vedas) consider the Shuddha Chaitanya as essential Jnana (knowledge). "Satyam Jnaanam Anantam Brahma" is a quotation from the Vedas. Therefore, Shuddha Jnana, which has neither a beginning nor an end, is the real Chaitanya.
Lets come to Vritti. It is a modification of the Antahkarana itself. Antahkarana by itself is Jada (inert). Vritti is also Jada. Therefore, it is not appropriate to call Vritti as "Saakshaat Pratyaksha Pramaa". Therefore, to consider that Vritti as Chaitanya is a loose definition. Therefore, your objection is against the Vedic dictum and therefore nor worthy of acceptance.

Therefore Chaitanya itself is Pratyaksha Pramaa. It is therefore clear that although Chaitanya is Anaadi, when it comes to specific situations (such as mentioned above), the senses (namely, the eyes etc.,) become Karanas to it.

Objection: Your entire argument is based on the premise that the specific Antahkarana Vritti Chaitanya is Saadi (sa+aadi = one with a beginning). Here, there are three aspects. They are Antahkarana, Vritti and Chaitanya (Jnana). You claim that these three are related. Based on this notion, you are presenting your argument. But it impossible for them to be related. Let us explain. Chaitanya (Jnana) is not related to Atma that always asserts as "I", "I". Let us consider an example. People say, "I am understanding" and not "my mind is understanding, I am not understanding". Therefore, knowledge (Jnana) must be related to Atma. Therefore, it would be appropriate and logical to say that Chaitanya is an attribute of Atma.
Also, you say ‘Antahkarana Vritti’ occurred. Mind (manas) is not like a stone. It is a very subtle thing – just like Akasha (space). It has no parts. A rock, on the other hand has parts and therefore, it is perfectly possible that it undergoes modifications. But how can something that is ultra-subtle and without parts undergo modifications? Are there modifications in the Akasha? Therefore, it would be wrong to say that Vritti arose in Antahkarana, which is devoid of parts. When Vritti itself is non-existent, what to say about specific Vritti Chaitanya? When this specific Vritti Chaitanya is non-existent, how can we accept your definition of Pratyaksha Pramaa?

Reply: Your objection has two main aspects. 1. That Jnana is an attribute of Atma and 2. That Manas (mind) is devoid of parts. Your entire objection revolves around these two aspects. Therefore, let us examine those two aspects. First, let us see whether the assumption that Manas is devoid of parts is true or not.
All objects that are Saadi (that which has a beginning) possess parts. That means, if an object is not Saadi, it implies that it has no parts. A good example for this is the Atma. Although Atma is indeed an object, it has no beginning. Therefore, it has not parts either. Even if something is Saadi, if it is not an object, it will have no parts. For instance, - form. A jar is different, its form is different. Form is a feeling. It has a beginning. But it has not parts. When something is a Dravya (object), and it has a beginning, it must have parts. It applies to all objects in the world.
Everyone agrees that mind is an object. Does it have a beginning? Does it not? Only the Vedas can answer this. The Vedas say "Tanmano srijata" – the Para Brahma created the Antahkarana is the meaning. Because it has been said to be created, the object called the mind certainly has parts. Because it has parts, it is possible that there is modification in the mind. This proves that to think that the Antahkarana is devoid of modification, is wrong.

Next, is knowledge an attribute of Atma? Or is it the attribute of Antahkarana? Lets us examine. Even here, it is better if we see what the Vedas say.

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says, "Kama (desire), Samkalpa (determination), Vichikitsa (doubt), Shraddha (dedication), Ashraddha, Dhriti (courage), Hree (shyness), Dhee (Antahkarana Vritti), Bhee (fear) – all this is Manas". This shows that Antahkarana Vritti is an attribute of mind. Therefore, the knowledge of the nature of Antahkarana Vritti cannot be an attribute of Atma.

Objection: The word Jnana is not there in the above list. The term Dhee is there. Although the term Dhee means Jnana, the Shruti (Vedas) says it is Manas only. It is not saying that it is caused by the Manas. You have interpreted the meaning of Dhee as Antahkarana Vritti. That is, a Vritti arising out of the mind. This is not in agreement with the Vedas – the authority cited by you. Is it not inconsistency?

Reply: If you think in that way, you will land in deeper difficulty. In the Vedic testimony stated above, it has also been said Kama itself is Manas. What does this mean? Does it mean that Kama (desire) arises from the mind or does it mean that Kama itself is Manas? To say Kama itself is Manas and Bhaya (fear) itself is Manas in the same breath is contradictory. It is inconsistent with mundane experience too. Therefore, all the aspects mentioned in the above sentence from the Vedas should be understood as ‘aspects or tendencies born out of the mind’. Therefore, the ancient philosophers have also considered them that way. Hence, Vritti Jnana is a function of the mind and not an attribute of Atma.

Objection: Sir, be that as it may. Let us keep aside for a while the topic of Vritti Jnana. Everyone says ‘I desire’, ‘I am learning’. ‘I am doubting’, ‘I am determining’, ‘I am fearing’ and so on. By this, it is clear that Kama (desire) etc., are the attributes of Atma. This is direct experience. What you are referring to as authority is a Shruti Pramana (testimony of authentic texts). There is contradiction between them. How is this possible? Therefore, we should interpret the words of the Vedas differently. The Vedas have said in one place, "Aayurvai ghritam"(it means, ghee itself is long life). It seems absurd if interpreted verbatim. What it means is, ghee enhances longevity. This is how it must be understood. Even in the quotation you have referred, "Kama etc., are the mind", it should not be interpreted verbatim. It should be interpreted as "Mind comes from Kama etc.". Then, it will mean that Kama etc., pertain to the Atma and Antahkarana etc., are born from them. It will neither contradict the authority of the Vedas nor will it be inconsistent with mundane experience. When such a concordance path is available, why do you want to follow a path that contradicts evidence?

Reply: The path of concordance you are suggesting is not compatible with the Shrutis (Vedas). The Vedas have affirmed in many places that Atma has no attributes. When such is the case, how can you say Kama etc., are the nature of Atma? "In day-to-day life, Kama etc., are experienced by people as being the nature of Atma; so where is the solution for this?" you may ask. Such an experience is born out of illusion. Experience in itself cannot be considered as the truth. Take the example of the boy traveling in a train. He sees the trees as moving. That is his experience. Just because it is his experience, does it become the truth? No. Why not? It is because, that experience comes from Bhranti (illusion).

Let us consider this example. There is a big iron ball. In its normal state, can it burn anything? No. Now, you heat it till it becomes red. Now put a paper on it. The paper will be reduced to ashes in no time. What burnt the paper? Is it the iron ball or the fire? In reality, it is the fire that burnt it. But generally, people say "don’t put paper on that iron ball; it will burn". That is, they say that the iron ball itself will burn the piece of paper. When it is the fire that is burning the paper, is it proper to say that the iron ball burnt it? Because of ultimate proximity of fire (heat) and the iron ball, laymen tend to attribute the quality of fire to the iron ball and say that the iron ball burnt the paper.

Exactly in the same way, Jeevatma and Antahkarana will be proximal to each other. Between them, it is the Antahkarana that underwent modifications such as Kama etc. When that happens, the Jeevatma, by virtue of his proximity to the Antahkarana, will forget the existing difference between himself and the Antahkarana and becomes deluded enough to feel that he himself is experiencing Kama etc. Because of this delusion, he will make statements such as, ‘I am desiring’, ‘I am fearing’ etc. Therefore, it must be realized that the experiences of the Jeevatma are born out of delusion and that in reality Kama etc., pertain to the mind only. Then, there will be no contradiction to the Vedas (which say that Atma has no modifications) and there will be no inconsistency as far as mundane experience is concerned. That’s how we can strike a balance.

Objection: You gave the example of iron ball and fire. Both of them are Pratyaksha (directly perceivable) objects. It is possible that when there are two directly perceivable things, delusion takes place. In our above discussion, between the Jeevatma and the mind, only Jeevatma is Pratyaksha. Mind is not. When one is Pratyaksha and the other is not, how can ‘delusion due to concomitance’ occur?

Reply: Let us continue our discussion by analyzing your question in detail.

(to be continued)